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Abstract: A collection of races in a single election can be audited as a
group by auditing a random sample of batches of ballots and combining
observed discrepancies in the races represented in those batches in a par-
ticular way: the maximum across-race relative overstatement of pairwise
margins (MARROP). A risk-limiting audit for the entire collection of races
can be built on this ballot-based auditing using a variety of probability sam-
pling schemes. The audit controls the familywise error rate (the chance that
one or more incorrect outcomes fails to be corrected by a full hand count)
at a cost that can be lower than that of controlling the per-comparison
error rate with independent audits. The approach is particularly efficient if
batches are drawn with probability proportional to a bound on the MAR-
ROP (PPEB sampling).
Keywords: error bounds in auditing, familywise error rate, per-comparison
error rate, probability proportional to size, sequential tests, simultaneous tests.
1. Introduction
Post election audits can control the risk of certifying an election outcome that
disagrees with the outcome that a full hand count would show. Pilot studies in
California have shown that risk-limiting audits of individual races of a variety of
sizes can be conducted economically, within the canvass period [3, 2]. However,
it is not efficient to audit a large number of races in a single election by simply
repeating the audit process for each of those races. The difficulty of auditing a
large collection of races is a logistical barrier to wider use of post-election audits
to control risk.
This paper presents an approach to auditing an arbitrarily large number of
races in an election by hand-counting those races that appear on the ballots in
a random sample of batches of ballots. Such ballot-based auditing is built into
some state audit laws, such as California’s “1% audit.”
In the new approach, for each batch of ballots in the sample, the discrepancies
in the votes in the races represented in that batch are combined into a summary
statistic, the maximum across-race relative overstatement of pairwise margins
(MARROP). This is a simple extension of the approach in [5] to cover more
∗I thank Mike Higgins, Mark Lindeman, Luke Miratrix and Ron Rivest for helpful conver-
sations.
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than one race. Any error that increased the apparent margin between some
winner and some loser in a given race is normalized by the apparent margin
between those candidates. The largest normalized error in a batch—maximized
first across pairs of winners and losers for a given race and then across races—
summarizes the error in the batch. This maximum across-race relative overstate-
ment of pairwise margins can then be used with existing methods designed for
auditing individual races to limit the risk of certifying an incorrect outcome to
α, for instance, the methods introduced in [4, 6, 7, 3]. The result is a simulta-
neous risk-limiting audit of all the races: the audit limits the chance that one
or more incorrect outcomes will go uncorrected to at most α.
This paper introduces the MARROP and gives a cartoon application to a
set of three races in an election in a jurisdiction roughly the size of a county.
The application uses the Kaplan-Markov bound [7] for a sample drawn with
probability proportional to an error bound [1, 3] to guarantee a known minimum
chance of a full hand count if that hand count would show that the outcome of
any of the races was wrong.
2. Maximum Across-Race Relative Overstatement of Pairwise
Margins (MARROP)
As [5] notes, for the apparent outcome of an election contest to be wrong, the
margin between some apparent winner of the contest and some apparent loser
of the contest must be overstated by at least 100% of the margin between them.
Scaling errors by the margins they affect makes them commensurable. This idea
extends to several races: for the apparent outcome of any of those races to be
wrong, for some race, the margin between some winner in that race and some
loser in that race must be overstated by at least 100%.
Suppose there are N batches of ballots that together cover R races. Not every
race is represented on every ballot, but together the N batches include every
ballot for all R races. Race r has Kr “candidates,” which could be politicians or
positions on an issue. For instance, the “candidates” for a ballot measure might
be “yes on Measure A” and “no on measure A.” The total number of candidates
or positions in all races is K =
∑R
r=1Kr. We take those K candidates to be
enumerated in some canonical order, for instance, alphabetically.
Voters eligible to vote in race r may vote for up to fr candidates in that race
(race r can have up to fr winners). The fr candidates who apparently won race
r are those inWr. Those who apparently lost race r are in Lr. The apparent vote
for candidate k in batch p is vkp. (If ballots in batch p do not include the race
r in which candidate k is competing, vkp ≡ 0.) The apparent vote for candidate
k is Vk ≡
∑N
p=1 vkp. If candidates w and ℓ are contestants in the same race r,
the reported margin of apparent winner w ∈ Wr over apparent loser ℓ ∈ Lr is
Vwℓ ≡ Vw − Vℓ > 0. (1)
The actual vote for candidate k in batch p—the number of votes for k that
an audit would find—is akp. If the ballots in batch p do not include the race
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in which candidate k is competing, akp ≡ 0. The actual vote for candidate k is
Ak ≡
∑N
p=1 akp. If candidates w and ℓ are contestants in the same race r, the
actual margin of candidate w ∈ Wr over candidate ℓ ∈ Lr is
Awℓ ≡ Aw −Aℓ. (2)
All the apparent winners of all R races are the true winners of those races if
min
r∈{1,...,R}
min
w∈Wr,ℓ∈Lr
Awℓ > 0. (3)
If w ∈ Wr and ℓ ∈ Lr, define
epwℓ ≡
{
(vwp−vℓp)−(awp−aℓp)
Vwℓ
, if ballots in batch p contain race r
0, otherwise.
(4)
For the actual outcome of any of the R races to differ from its apparent outcome,
there must exist r ∈ {1, . . . , R}, w ∈ Wr and ℓ ∈ Lr for which
∑N
p=1 epwℓ ≥ 1.
The maximum across-race relative overstatement of pairwise margins in batch
p is
ep ≡ max
r∈{1,...,R}
max
w∈Wr,ℓ∈Lr
epwℓ. (5)
Now
max
r∈{1,...,R}
max
w∈Wr,ℓ∈Lr
N∑
p=1
epwℓ ≤
N∑
p=1
max
r∈{1,...,R}
max
w∈Wr,ℓ∈Lr
epwℓ =
N∑
p=1
ep ≡ E. (6)
The sum on the right, E, is the maximum across-race relative overstatement of
pairwise margins (MARROP). If E < 1, the apparent electoral outcome of each
of the R races is the same outcome that a full hand count would show.
Think of the family of R null hypotheses, the outcome of race r is incorrect .
Then E < 1 is a sufficient condition for the entire family of R null hypotheses to
be false. If an audit gives strong statistical evidence that E < 1, we can safely
conclude that the apparent outcomes of all R races are correct. If we test the
hypothesis E ≥ 1 at significance level α, that gives a test of the family of R
hypotheses with familywise error rate no larger than α.
Suppose the number of valid ballots cast in batch p for race r is at most
brp.
1 Clearly awp ≥ 0 and aℓp ≤ brp, if ℓ is a candidate in race r. Hence,
epwℓ ≤ (vwp − vℓp + brp)/Vwℓ, and so
ep ≤ max
r∈{1,...,R}
max
w∈Wr,ℓ∈Lr
vwp − vℓp + brp
Vwℓ
≡ up. (7)
1If the batches are homogeneous with respect to ballot style, then b1p = b2p = . . . = bRp.
This is the case when batches of ballots correspond to precincts. In some jurisdictions, however,
VBM ballots are counted in “decks” that bear no special relationship to geography. Then, the
values of brp for a single batch p can depend on the race r.
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The bound up is a limit on the relative overstatement of any margin that can
be concealed in batch p. If U ≡
∑
p up < 1, the outcome of the election must be
correct so no audit is needed.
Otherwise, if the values of up are generally small, error sufficient to cause the
wrong candidate to appear to win any of the races must be spread out across
many batches, while if some of the values of up are large, outcomes can be
wrong even if most batches show no error at all. The values of up can be used
to perform NEGEXP sampling or sampling with probability proportional to an
error bound (PPEB) [1].
The values of ep observed in a random sample (simple, stratified, NEGEXP
or PPEB) can be used to calculate a P value for the compound hypothesis that
one or more of the apparent outcomes of the R races differs from the outcome
that a full hand count of all the ballots in that race would show. See [7] for
details. Those P -value calculations can be embedded in a sequential procedure
for testing whether one or more of the outcomes is wrong, using approaches like
that described by [6]. The resulting test controls the familywise error rate for
testing the collection of hypotheses that the outcome of each race is correct. That
is, the test keeps small the chance of incorrectly concluding that the outcomes
are correct when any of the outcomes is wrong.
The taint of batch p is
τp =
ep
up
≤ 1. (8)
For PPEB samples, it is convenient to work with taint τp rather than with error
ep, because the expected value of the taint in a batch drawn by PPEB is E/U .
See [7, 3].
3. Illustration
This section presents a cartoon of an election with R = 3 contests in a jurisdic-
tion that has 200 precincts. Each of the three races has only two contestants.
Race A is jurisdiction-wide; the overall result is 50% for the apparent winner,
45% for the apparent loser, and 5% undervotes and invalid ballots. Race B in-
volves half the precincts in the jurisdiction; the overall result for this race is
50% for the apparent winner, 40% for the apparent loser, and 10% undervotes
and invalid ballots. Race C involves 60 of the precincts in the jurisdiction, of
which 30 overlap with the second race. The overall result for this race is 50%
for the apparent winner, 35% for the apparent loser, and 15% undervotes and
invalid ballots.
The auditable batches of ballots comprise ballots cast either in-precinct (IP)
or by mail (VBM) for each of the 200 precincts in the jurisdiction; thus there
are N = 400 auditable batches of ballots in all. For the sake of illustration, we
take the IP batches to contain 400 ballots each and the VBM batches to contain
200 ballots each, and we assume that, for each race, the margins are the same
in all 400 batches. A summary is given in table 1.
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IP batches VBM batches
Race precincts batches ballots winner loser margin winner loser winner loser
A 200 400 120,000 60,000 54,000 6,000 200 180 100 90
B 100 200 60,000 30,000 24,000 6,000 200 160 100 80
C 60 120 36,000 18,000 12,600 5,400 200 140 100 70
Table 1
Hypothetical reported results for an election with three overlapping races.
Race A spans the entire jurisdiction, 200 precincts. Race B includes 100 of the precincts
in the jurisdiction. Race C includes 60 of the precincts in the jurisdiction; 30 of those
are also in race B. Each precinct is divided into two batches of ballots: 400 ballots cast
in-precinct (IP) and 200 ballots cast by mail (VBM). In addition to valid votes for the
candidates, there are undervotes and invalid ballots.
batch type batches up
IP–Race A only 70 0.0700
VBM–Race A only 70 0.0350
IP–Races A and B 70 0.0733
VBM–Races A and B 70 0.0367
IP–Races A and C 30 0.0852
VBM–Races A and C 30 0.0426
IP–Races A, B & C 30 0.0852
VBM–Races A, B & C 30 0.0426
Table 2
Upper bounds on the MARROP in each batch for the eight kinds of batches of ballots in a
hypothetical race.
There are eight situations to consider in calculating up: IP versus VBM
batches where voters can vote only in race A, in races A and B, in races A and C,
and in all three races. Consider the last of these for an IP batch (brp = 400).
up = max
{
200− 180 + 400
6, 000
,
200− 160 + 400
6, 000
,
200− 140 + 400
5, 400
}
= max{0.0700, 0.0733, 0.0852}= 0.0852. (9)
For a VBM batch in which voters were eligible to vote in all three races (brp =
200),
up = max
{
100− 90 + 200
6, 000
,
100− 80 + 200
6, 000
,
100− 70 + 200
5, 400
}
= max{0.0350, 0.0367, 0.0426}= 0.0426. (10)
Table 2 lists the values of up for all eight cases. The total of all the error bounds
for all N = 400 batches is
U = 70×(0.0700+0.0350+0.0733+0.0367)+2×30×(0.0852+0.0426) = 22.718.
(11)
Suppose we want to design a PPEB-based audit that has at least a 75%
chance of requiring a full hand count if a full hand count would show a different
outcome for any of the three races. That controls the risk (that an incorrect
result will not be corrected by a full hand count) to be at most α = 0.25. We
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can base such an audit on the Kaplan-Markov approach in [7]. We draw n times
with replacement from the 400 batches. In each draw, the chance of selecting
batch p is up/U . The draws are independent.
Let Tj be the taint of the jth draw, that is, Tj = τp ≡ ep/up for the batch p
that is selected in the jth draw. Define
P ≡
n
min
j=1
j∏
i=1
1− 1/U
1− Ti
. (12)
Then we can stop the audit without a full hand count if P < α = 0.25 [7].
In particular, suppose we make n = 36 PPEB draws, 5 of which show taint
τp = 0.04 and the rest of which show τp = 0.
2 Then P = 0.243: we could stop
the audit without a full hand count. The risk that the outcome of any of the
three races is wrong is at most 25% (and plausibly far lower, since this approach
makes a number of very conservative choices).
Note that the expected number of distinct batches drawn in the n = 36 draws
is
400∑
p=1
[1− (1− up/U)
36] = 34.3, (13)
about 8.6% of the 400 auditable batches. However, those batches would tend
to be the larger (IP) batches. Let bp denote the number of ballots in batch p
(bp = 400 for IP batches and bp = 200 for VBM batches). The expected number
of ballots audited is
400∑
p=1
bp[1− (1 − up/U)
36] = 11, 387.3, (14)
about 9.5% of the 120,000 ballots. The expected number of votes audited,
20,617.68, can be calculated analogously: substitute in place of bp the num-
ber of voting possibilities in batch p (from 200 for VBM batches that include
only race A up to 1,200 for IP batches that include all three races).
In contrast, suppose we were auditing only race A. Then the error bounds
would be up = 0.07 for the 200 IP batches and up = 0.035 for the 200 VBM
batches; The total error bound would be UA = 21, a bit smaller than the
previous value, U = 22.718. If the sample taints in n = 36 draws were as
before—five equal to 0.04 and 31 equal to 0—the value of P would be 0.212.
This is a bit smaller than the value 0.243 for auditing all three races, stronger
evidence that the outcome of that single race was correct.
Conversely, if we had made only n = 33 draws and had seen five taints equal
to 0.04 and 28 equal to zero, the value of P would be 0.245, and we would
2Taint of 0.04 corresponds to a different number of errors in different batches, depending
on the value of up in the batch and the margin that the error affects. In an IP batch of ballots
that includes race C, an error that overstates the margin in race A or race B by 20 votes is a
taint of just under 0.04, while in a VBM batch of ballots that includes only race A, an error
that overstates the margin in race A by 8 votes is a taint of just under 0.04.
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be able to confirm the outcome of that single race with risk no greater than
α = 0.25. The workload would be somewhat lower, both because we would be
counting only one race on each ballot and because the number of batches drawn
would be lower. The expected number of batches audited would be 31.6 versus
34.3, and the expected number of ballots audited would be 9,778 versus 11,387.
But we would only be testing the outcome of race A.
Suppose we audited all three races independently. We have a choice to make
about multiplicity—the fact that we are testing more than one hypothesis. The
simultaneous audit procedure based on MARROP has the property that there
is at least 75% chance of a full hand count of every race that has an incorrect
outcome, i.e., risk at most α = 0.25 that one or more incorrect outcomes will be
certified. Suppose we choose to maintain this property—keeping the familywise
error rate (FWER) at most α = 0.25. We split the risk across the three audits
by requiring each to have chance at least 0.751/3 = 0.909 of a full count if the
outcome is incorrect. The chance all three will progress to full counts if all three
outcomes are incorrect is then at least 0.9093 = 0.75.
We could instead control the per-comparison error rate (PCER) to be at most
α = 0.25. That would mean that for each audited race, the chance of a full hand
count if the outcome is wrong is at least 75%. However, the chance that one
or more of the three races escapes a full hand count can be greater than 0.25
when more than one outcome is wrong. This way of dealing with multiplicity
is a bit unfair to MARROP, because MARROP in fact has a lower error rate.
Keeping the PCER below 0.25 requires rather smaller sample sizes than keeping
the FWER below 0.25.
Table 3 lays out the total error bounds for auditing the three races separately
and the sample sizes that would be needed to stop the audits without a full count
if the corresponding samples had at most five taints no larger than 0.04 and the
rest of the taints were zero, while keeping the familywise error rate (FWER) or
the per-comparison error rate (PCER) under α = 0.25.
How much work should we expect to do to audit all three races separately?
Let uAp denote the error bound for batch p if only race A is audited. Let UA =∑N
p=1 uAp. Define uBp, UB, uCp and UC analogously. The expected number of
distinct batches that would be audited in all is
N∑
p=1
[1− (1 − uAp/UA)
nA(1 − uBp/UB)
nB (1− uCp/UC)
nC ], (15)
and the expected number of distinct ballots audited would be
N∑
p=1
bp[1− (1− uAp/UA)
nA(1− uBp/UB)
nB (1 − uCp/UC)
nC ]. (16)
For some of those batches of ballots, only one race would be audited; for some,
two races; and for some, all three. See table 3 for numerical comparisons of
MARROP against independent audits that control FWER or PCER. MARROP
is much more efficient in this example.
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FWER PCER
expected expected expected expected expected expected
Race U n batches ballots votes n batches ballots votes
A 21.00 52 48.49 16,074.23 16,074.23 33 31.58 10,488.77 10,488.77
B 11.00 28 26.01 8,615.69 8,615.69 17 16.27 5,402.16 5,402.16
C 7.67 19 17.50 5,795.81 5,795.81 12 11.41 3,787.51 3,787.51
all 85.13 28,038.26 30,485.73 56.38 18,649.98 19,678.44
MARROP 22.72 36 34.30 11,387.29 20,617.68
Table 3
Comparison of independent and simultaneous audits controlling FWER and PCER.
The familywise error rate (FWER) of a collection of audits is the chance that one or
more fails to result in a hand count when the corresponding outcome is incorrect. If the
FWER is at most 0.25, the chance that there is a full hand count of every race with
an incorrect outcome is at least 75%. The per-comparison error rate of a collection of
audits is the chance that each audit fails to result in a hand count when the outcome
of the race under audit is incorrect. If the PCER is at most 0.25, then, for each race, if
the outcome is wrong, there is at least a 75% chance of a full hand count. However, the
chance that there is a full hand count of every race with an incorrect outcome could be
less than 75%: PCER is less stringent than FWER. The total bounds on the error are
given in column 2. Suppose we design the audits to stop if no more than five nonzero
taints of no more than 0.04 are observed; otherwise, the audit progresses to a full hand
count. To control the FWER, the number of draws is in column 3; the expected number
of distinct batches audited in column 4; the expected number of distinct ballots audited
in column 5; and the expected number of votes audited is in column 6. To control the
PCER, the number of draws is in column 7; the expected number of distinct batches
audited in column 8; the expected number of distinct ballots audited in column 9; and
the expected number of votes audited is in column 10. The row labeled “all” gives the
overall expected number of distinct batches and ballots audited in the three independent
audits to control the FWER or the PCER. The row labeled “MARROP” gives the
values for a simultaneous audit of all three races using the maximum across race relative
overstatement of pairwise margins, which controls the FWER to be 0.25 or below. Far
less work is required than using independent audits the risk to the same level, measured
by expected ballots or batches. The expected number of votes is far less than required
to control the FWER using independent audits, and only slightly higher than required
to control the PCER—even though the MARROP audit controls FWER.
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The simultaneous approach based on the MARROP controls the overall risk
with far less auditing effort. The effort depends strongly on the number of
batches as well as the number of votes, because there are substantial logistical
costs associated with pulling batches of ballots together for counting, and there
are economies in counting all the races on a single ballot. Even though MARROP
controls FWER, the workload is lower than for independent audits that only
control PCER—a less stringent criterion—if work is measured by the number
of batches or ballots audited. (The number of votes audited is a bit higher than
for independent audits that control PCER, but far lower than for independent
audits that control FWER.)
4. Summary
A collection of races can be audited simultaneously using the maximum across-
race relative overstatement of pairwise margins (MARROP). Drawing batches
using probability proportional to an upper bound on the MARROP—a form
of PPEB sampling [1]—and analyzing the results using the Kaplan-Markov
bound [7] can lead to reasonably efficient and economical control of the family-
wise error rate: the risk that one or more incorrect election outcomes will escape
a full hand count. Compared with auditing races independently to control the
risk to the same level, the MARROP approach can reduce the expected number
of batches, ballots and votes that need to be audited.
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